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Health Care System Reform in China:   
Issues, Challenges and Options 
 




This paper examines health care reform in urban and rural China. Before health care 
reform, Chinese health service facilities were run entirely by the state and basically 
they performed a social welfare function. This health care system greatly improved 
the population health conditions but many problems started to emerge in 1980s when 
the economic reform started. Since then, the government has been struggling to 
maintain a balance between meeting people’s health care needs and develop the health 
care “industry”. 
Problems and their contribution factors in organization, financing and 
performance of the health care reform are examined and analyzed.  In terms of 
organization, decentralization of the decision making power in health sector and 
marketization of the medical establishments constitutes the main organizational 
changes in the health care reform.   This organizational reform of health sector as an 
imposed institution change, encounters lots of resistance in the process of 
implementation.  A tremendous amount of conflictions arises because of the 
commercialization of health sector that used to perform social welfare function.  In 
terms of financing, share of organized financing (government and social fund) in the 
total health expenditure declined dramatically since the reform.  In urban China, 
Health care insurance faced tough going on universal access.  In rural China, there 
are lots of problems in implementing new cooperative health system partly because of 
its imperfect design.  In terms of performance, data shows that there is growing 
inequity in health status between rural and urban in the past 15 years.    Inefficiencies 
also exists in both resource allocation and service delivery.     
Several options are analyzed for organizational reform and health care financing.  
The report recommends that the aims of the future reform policy that government 
would adopt should be to improve the population health status instead of generating 
profit for institutions or industry.  The social welfare function of health care system 
should be reinforced and at the same time managed competition in the health care 
market should be encouraged.  In health care financing in urban area, several 
directions of broadening risk pooling are discussed.  In rural health care financing, 
the designing of new cooperative health care system is analyzed.  Rural financing 
should be more flexible in order to attract more people to join the cooperative 
medical system.  It is recommended that Chinese government should increase 
funding for public health programs and subsidize health services for the 
disadvantaged groups.     2
 
I. Introduction to Health Care System Reform in China 
 
The Chinese health care system used to be held as a model by WHO for the rest of the 
world because China has made great progress in improving the health status of its 
population since 1949.  From 1952 to 1982, the life expectancy of Chinese people 
rises from 35 years to 68 years and the infant mortality drops from 240 to 40 deaths 
per 1000 births (MOH 1989)
.  The broadly acclaimed achievements partly owes to 
the traditional health care system: central planning, emphasis on primary care, 
community organization and cooperative financing (Hsiao 1995).       
Ever since its establishment, the health care system in China is bifurcated because 
of the great disparity between urban and rural.    The urban health care system and the 
rural health care system are very different from each other and have undergone 
different reforms. 
In urban areas, free health services were provided to public employees at the 
health service facilities financed and managed by the government.  Under the 
command economy, health care was administered in two publicly financed schemes: 
the Labor Insurance System (LIS) and the Public health Insurance System (PIS).  
The former covered workers in all state-run enterprises and the latter covered 
employees in government organs and academic/political institutions.  In terms of 
medical establishments, before 1980, the government determined hospital budget, 
personnel and the prices of drugs and service.       
In rural areas, a three-tier health care system was developed to serve the rural 
population, which constitutes three quarter of the entire population.    This system was 
composed of village local services, township health center and county/city hospitals.  
All aspects of health care delivery were financed by public resources.  Health 
insurance was in the form of Cooperative Health Care System (CHCS).  It relied on 
the collective economy system and was based on the voluntary collaboration of the 
rural residents.  After issue of “Rural Medical Cooperation Rules”, almost 90% of 
the villages were covered by CHCS that was funded through the contributions of the 
members, the welfare funds of the brigade and the welfare funds of the commune 
(Lennart 1996).    Members of CHCS received health services for free or at a reduced 
cost. 
In summary, before the reform, all health service facilities were run entirely by the 
state and basically they performed a social welfare function. 
In 1978, China lunched its economic reform that aimed at speed up the 
development of the economy through fiscal decentralizing and introducing market 
competition in labor and product.   As a result, the funding for hospitals from 
government kept declining (See Table 1) (MOH 2001).    The collective and command 
economy that the old health care system relied on started to go through dramatic 
change.    In this wider context, the reform of health system was bound to happen. 
On the verge of the reform, many problems of the old health care system started to 
emerge.  When the economic reform just began in 1979, the health care system was 
not given enough attention.  Over-utilization and abuse of free medical care were   3
widespread (Guo 2003).  There was no incentive to control the cost in both supply 
side and demand side.  As a result, the health care expenditure kept rising at an 
unreasonable speed – health care spending under LIS and PIS increased 28 times from 
1978 to 1997, while the fiscal income of the government increased only 6.6 times 
(Wang 1999).  The great financial burden sometimes drained enterprises and 
government treasuries. 
Besides the huge health care cost, another problem is the narrow coverage – the 
workers in the fast-developing private/foreign enterprises were not covered and the 
laid-off workers were not covered.    The increasing self-employed people also did not 
enjoy any health care insurance. 
During the economic reform, many enterprises faced financial difficulties or 
become bankrupt.  In that case, they did not have any steady financial sources or 
rational mechanisms to pool funds to pay for the health care expenditure of their 
workers (Tang 2006).  It demonstrated that the capacity of the LIS to resist risk is 
low (Wang 1999). 
In rural, as the economic reform intensified, the rural communes which were the 
social basis for CHCS disintegrated.  Many township hospitals had to close down 
because of the increasing material cost and decreasing public funding.    The three-tire 
health care system weakened significantly.   Access to health care became a major 
issue for many poor households. 
All those problems have intensified social contradictions, and become a potential 
threat to social stability.  Therefore, it is necessary to reform the health care system 
and make it compatible with the market economic system (MOLSS 1999) .       
Since 1980s, the health care system in China started to undergo reforms and 
modifications.  The initial change was uncoordinated and the purpose was to slow 
down the growth rate of health care spending at the local level (Guo 2003).  In this 
period, co-payment was introduced in some areas.    In 1993, the central committee of 
Chinese Community Party (CCP) passed a resolution on market reform that pointed 
out the direction of the health care reform (Central Committee of Chinese Communist 
Party 1993).    Basically, the reform shifted part of the health care financing burden to 
individuals and decided on a health care system combining a socially pooled fund and 
an individual account.  The new system were experimented in Zhenjiang and 
Jiujiang and then expanded to the whole nation.  In 1998, State Council and CCP 
central community issued anther landmark decree “Decision on the Establishment of 
the Basic Health Insurance System for Urban Staff and Workers” which declared that 
the new health insurance will cover all urban workers except for the self-employed 
(State Council 1998).  In 2003, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Agriculture jointly issued “Circulation on the Establishment of a 
New-Style Rural Cooperative Health Care System” which tries to set up a health 
insurance system in rural that is organized by the government, funded by government 
and individual, and enrolled voluntarily (MOH, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Agriculture  2003).   
According to all those official regulations, the three major components of urban 
health care reform (health institution, medicine production/pricing and health   4
insurance) as well as the rural health care reform are overviewed as follows. 
In the health institution reform, the medical establishments were decentralized.  
Also, the reform separated management of provision of medical services and the 
provision of medicine, and to make the health institutions compatible with the market 
economy.  After the reform, MOH will no longer “manage” hospitals.  Instead, 
MOH “supervises” hospitals.    Health care is administered as an industry. (Tang 2006)   
As a result of the autonomy, the hospitals would have to compete with each other for 
patients and the consumer would have more choices. 
In terms of medicine distribution system, the major changes are as follows: 
separation of hospitals and pharmacies, reinforce quality control of drugs and 
introduction of public bidding system to prevent corruption and limit drug prices (Guo 
2003).  While price of the health care services is still controlled by the government, 
the price of medicines is largely liberated. 
The new health care insurance system consolidates PIS and LIS into one insurance 
program and extends the coverage to all urban employees (expect for self-employed).   
The previous work-unit based health care system was transformed to a social based 
insurance system.  Both employer and employee contribute to the trust fund.  The 
set up of the accounts shares some similarity with the medical saving account in 
Singapore.  Besides, the management system of this scheme is separated from the 
delivery and financing system and is operated by the local government.    Essentially, 
the new insurance system is to socialize the health care administration by transferring 
the administration of health care from employers to local government, and to make 
government, employer and employee share the cost of health care (Peng 1996). 
In rural areas, under the New-Style CHCS, each individual is to contribute a small 
amount every year in order to participate the health insurance system.    The collective 
economic entities in villages as well as the central government should also contribute 
to the fund.  The local treasury manages the trust fund.  This new CHCS fund is 
primarily used for large medical expenditures and hospitalization charges. (Tang 
2006) 
The organization, financing and performance of the health care reform will be 
examined and assessed in the following three chapters, respectively.       5
II. Health Service Organization – Imposed Institutional Change 
 
Health care system as the product of cultural, political and economic environment of 
the society, relied heavily on the institutional configuration of the society.      Changes 
in the social institutional configurations may lead to further demands for change in its 
institutional arrangements (Gu 2001).  Market economy reform has transformed 
many elements of the Chinese institutional configuration, and the health care system 
is no exception.    Decentralization of the decision making power in health sector and 
marketization of the medical establishments constitutes the main organizational 
changes in the health care reform.     
1.  Decentralized and Fragmented Health Care System 
China decentralized the fiscal system in the mid-1980s in an effort to rectify the 
inefficiencies of the centralized command system (Thunberg 1989).  From 1981 to 
2003, the share of central budgetary expenditure in national expenditure decreases 
from 55.0% to 30.1% while the share of local budgetary expenditure increases from 
45.0% to 69.9 % (see Table 2).    The decision making of health care spending, as one 
of the social spending, was also decentralized to provinces and then local 
governments.   
Under the fiscal decentralization, the decision making power of grant allocation 
between sectors was delegated to the local governments.  In the past twenty years, 
most local governments considered the economic development a priority and did not 
pay much attention to the health sectors.  A responsibility system was introduced 
into the health care institution in many places, which encouraged the hospitals to 
generate revenue themselves.     
Decentralized health care system might increase efficiency in terms of local 
investment and spending.   However, the disarray in decentralization diminishes 
government’s role in managing public health programs (Liu 2004).  Fragmentation 
of health care responsibility at the central government level also contributes to this 
problem.  At the central government level, MOH is supposed to provide general 
guidelines of health care policy.    However, the organization of the health services in 
China is unique in some sense.  In most other countries, MOH or other similar 
department usually takes full responsibility of administrating and financing health 
care.  In China, the administration and financing of health care are segmented: the 
MOLSS is in charge of urban health insurance, the MOH is in charge of the rural 
sector and the Ministry of Civic Affairs (MOCA) is for poor households in urban and 
rural (Hu 2004).    In general, the MOH is in a weak position to implement the health 
policy since it doesn’t directly finance health care or control personnel (Hsiao 1995; 
Liu 2004). 
Partly due to the decentralization and fragmentation of the health care system, the 
communication within the system is not sufficient and the government control is 
relatively weak.  When there is wide spread epidemic, such as Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the structural deficiencies of the public health system   6
become  obvious.  In  the  SARS crisis, the vice minister of MOH explained why there 
was under-reporting of SARS cases in Beijing at the beginning (Department of 
Regional Development 2000): 
“There are 175 tertiary hospitals in Beijing… these hospitals do not share 
information and are not under the same administration… the city government of 
Beijing did not have comprehensive and accurate statistics.” 
Another effect of fiscal decentralization of health care system is that it limits the 
central government’s ability to allocate resource to subsidize the poor region (World 
Bank 1997).  Under the previous centralized health care system, the central 
government could transfer resources from the rich provinces to the poor provinces 
more easily.  After reform, each province shoulders a lot more responsibility for its 
local health care system.  As a result, the richer regions with ample revenue enjoy a 
better health care system than the poor regions.    This is similar with India where the 
southern rich states have better health services.         
2.  Marketization of Medical Establishments 
Owing to the decentralization of the health system, local governments started to take 
on the responsibilities in the health service delivery.  As the reform proceeded, a 
common practice of the local governments is to encourage hospitals to finance itself 
through the health care market (Gu 2001).  The previous administrative-subordinate 
relationship between government and hospitals was replaced by the supervisor-service 
provider relationship, and health care is administered as an industry (Tang  2006).   
After this transformation, medical establishments are classified into two categories: 
for-profit and non-profit.  The for-profit medical establishments may determine the 
price of services themselves while the non-profit medical establishments’ service 
price should be regulated by the government.    Although majority of the hospitals fell 
into the non-profit category and remain a part of public sector, they actually achieved 
autonomy.  The control over all the daily affairs is completely converted from 
bureaucracy hierarchical system to hospital administrators.  The non-profit hospitals 
still get some public funding, but their financing increasingly depends on health care 
market. 
As a result of marketization of hospitals and the resulting competition, the 
management of hospital leadership and the overall quality of hospital services have 
improved (Social Security Research Institute 2001).  Also, more and more hospitals 
entered the health care market supported by the private forces.  One example is in 
Xinxiang city in Henan province, where the government and a company establish a 
new hospital management together in 2004 (Tang 2006).   
At the same time, the problems of health care commercialization become more 
and more prominent.  Health care consumption is special in the sense that there is 
information asymmetry between supplier and consumer - the supplier could to certain 
extend decide the quality and quantity of the consumption because of the advantage 
on health care knowledge.  Provider-induced over-consumption becomes an 
important driver of the increasing health care expenditure in China.  Now an   7
unspoken rule in the current health care market is that, in order to increase income, 
the doctors would prescribe unnecessary or repetitive medical services (Chinese 
Economic Report 2006).   
Along with the hospital autonomy, the price system of health services and drugs 
is also reformed.    The State Development Planning Commission and the Ministry of 
Health and Finance are still responsible for setting health service prices (Meng 2004).   
In addition, the prices of medicines which are on the State Catalog of Medicines are 
also determined by the government (Tang 2006).  However, the prices of many new 
drugs and examination fee of many new and expensive medical equipment are 
liberated  (Gu  2001).  The  original  intention  of the government was to keep the basic 
drugs and services affordable, but the result is that the hospitals tend to prescribe the 
expensive drugs to make money. 
Combining the commercialization of hospitals and reforms in the price system, 
the problem of provider-induced over-consumption in health is exacerbated (Gu 2001).   
The marketization of health care provides the hospital incentives to oversubscribe, 
and the setting of price system boost the overuse of new and expensive medicines and 
services.    Partly due to this joint effect, the health care expenditure escalated rapidly 
– the health care expenditure increases from 11.02 billion Yuan in 1978 to 658.41 
billion Yuan in 2003 (See Figure 2) (MOH 2005).    A significant percentage of health 
spending was from the personal saving of the population (detailed analysis in Chapter 
4).  The heavy burden of health care cost was called one of the “New Three 
Mountains” by the Chinese people (China Observation 2005). 
Figure 2 Health care expenditure in China (1984-2005) 































































Source: MOH, China Health Statistical Year Book, various years. 
Many blame the doctors and hospitals for violating the ethic codes by inducing 
over-consumption and exerting heavy burdens on patients.  Actually, it is more a 
problem of the system than a problem of ethics. 
3.  Government’s Role in “Market Failure” 
Market failure usually refers to a situation in which a free market does not produce   8
socially efficient outcomes.  In the health care sector it is more a situation where 
market forces do not serve the perceived public interest.    In addressing the problems 
in Chinese health care system, World Bank made a critical remark in the 1997 report: 
“Health is a sector that can not simply be left to market forces” (World Bank 1997).  
Government need to intervene in the health care to address the so called “market 
failure” (World Bank 2005).     
In terms of supply-demand in the health care market, the autonomy of health care 
coupled with financial incentives is believed to have increased the supplier-induced 
demand, as described in the previous section.  The government did not address this 
problem effectively.   
In terms of externality and public goods in the health care market, the 
government’s policy on the set up of health care organization also needs to be 
improved.  After fiscal decentralization of health sector, many public-good type 
programs, such as preventive service institution and surveillance programs are 
hindered (World Bank 2005). One priority of future government spending on health 
care should be for those public health programs.   
 
 
The change from an existing institutional arrangement to an alternative is always a 
costly process and requires collective action (Lin 1989).    Yifu Lin, a famous Chinese 
economist, believes that there are two types of institutional change: induced and 
imposed.  An induced institutional is voluntarily initiated and executed by 
individuals in response to profitable opportunities, while an imposed change is 
introduced and executed by governmental orders or laws (Lin 1989).     
The Chinese health care system reform is “a typical example of imposed 
institutional change” (Gu 2001).  As discussed previously, the Chinese health care 
system started years later after the economic reform began.    In many situations it is a 
forced reform because of the collapse of its basis.    For example, after the bankrupt of 
the state owned enterprise paralyzed the LIS, the central government issued 
regulations to introduce new systems.  It is necessary for the state to remove the 
institutional impediments in order to proceed with the market economic reform, and 
the old health care system was one of them.  This organizational reform of health 
sector as an imposed institution change, encounters lots of resistance in the process of 
implementation.  Currently hot debates are going on about the health care reform in 
China, but the obvious lesson is that economic prosperity does not automatically 
guarantee the improvement in health and health care.    Given the large population and 
the vast regional disparity, China still has a long way to go in its health care reform.   9
III. Financing Health Care - Weakened Government Role   
 
According to WHO, the financing of health care system is composed of three 
interrelated elements: revenue collection, pooling of resources and purchasing of 
interventions (WHO 2000).  In most insurance schemes, revenue collection and 
polling, which is traditionally known as the “insurance function”, are integrated in one 
organization and one process (WHO 2000).  In light of this categorization, this 
chapter would examine and access the health care financing in China in terms of 
public financing, risk pooling and strategic purchasing. 
1.  Decreasing Organized Financing 
Closely related to the decentralization and marketization of health care system is the 
weakening of government role in health care financing.  Overall speaking, China is 
spending more and more on health care – 3.0 % of GDP was spent on health care in 
1978 and 5.6% of GDP was spent on health care in 2003 (MOH 2005; National 
Bureau of Statistics 2006) (See Table 3).  However, share of organized financing 
(government and social fund) in the total health expenditure has being declining.  
Along with the commercialization of the health sector and the prevalence of the 
fee-for-service payment, private out-of-pocket spending gradually filled that financing 
gap.  Fee-for-service payment mechanism has very negative effect on cost 
containment, and the poor population is hurt most since their ability to pay out of 
pocket is much lower.     
The important trends on health financing since the reform are as follows (see 
Table 4) (MOH 2006):   
  Percentage of government health expenditure in the total health expenditure 
decreases from 38.9% in 1982 to 17% in 2004, with the historic low of 15.5% in 
2000. 
  Percentage of social health expenditure (including enterprise units health 
expenditure, non-profit units health expenditure, administrative units health 
expenditure and rural collective health expenditure) in the total health expenditure 
decreases from 47.4% in 1978 to 29.3% in 2004, with the historic low of 24.1% in 
2001. 
  Percentage of personal health expenditure in the total health expenditure rises 
from 20.4% in 1978 to 53.6% in 2004 with the peak of 60.0% in 2001. 
The high share of personal out-of-pocket payment is partly due to the low 
coverage of health care insurance.    According to The Third National Health Services 
Investigation in 2003, 64.5% of the Chinese population totally rely on private 
out-of-pocket payment when seeking for health services (MOH 2004).  Only 35.5% 
of the population is covered by health insurance coverage and the share is as follows: 
PIS and LIS cover 2.3%, cooperative insurance covers 8.0%, basic health insurance 
covers 8.2%, commercial health insurance covers 7.0% and other social health 
insurance covers 10.0% (MOH 2004).  According to an unofficial social survey 
conducted in 7 provinces in 2005 (sample size: 3859), about a quarter of the patients   10
abandoned medical treatment because they can not afford it (International Consulting 
Information Net 2005).  Obviously, risk pooling becomes a primary issue in 
assessing the health care financing.  The following two sectors would examine the 
reformed risk pooling mechanism in urban and rural, respectively.   
2.  Risk Pooling in Urban – Facing Tough Going on Universal Access   
The reform of health care insurance system began in 1990s.    In the beginning, it was 
only modifications to the old health insurance system in order to curb the rising health 
care expenditure.  The real action starts in 1994, when the “Two Jiang Experiment” 
(Zhenjiang and Jiujiang) set up the model of combination of socially pooled fund and 
personal fund.  The philosophy of this system – combining personal responsibility 
with social risk pooling – is similar with the health care insurance system in 
Singapore.    However, its uniqueness lies in the merge of funds from contributors and 
the separation of the funds into two accounts.     
The funding model is as follows: employee contributes 2% of his/her wage and 
employer contributes 10% each month to the health insurance fund; the fund is 
divided into tow accounts: 4-6% to personal account (depends on age) and 5-7% to 
social coordinating account.    The employee’s contribution is owned by the employee 
and could be inherited (State Comission of Economic Reform etal 1996). 
The payment procedure is a three-phase passage model: first, the insured draws 
money from personal account to pay medical bills; second (when the personal account 
is depleted), the insured pay the bills out of pocket; third (when self-payment exceeds 
the pre-set threshold),the medical bills are jointly paid by the socially pooled account 
and the insured (Tang 2006).  There were also other experiments going on in cities 
like Shenzhen and Yantai, this “Two Jiang” model received more attention and was 
replicated in many other cities starting in 1996. 
The landmark health insurance reform happened in 1998 when Decision on the 
Establishment of the Basic Health Insurance System for Urban Staff and Workers 
(1998 Decree) was issued.  The 1998 Decree aims on providing universal access to 
the basic health care.  It applies to all the urban hiring units including government 
organs, state-owned enterprises, collectively-owned enterprises, foreign enterprises, 
social organizations and private entities.    The enrollment of workers in the township 
enterprises and individual economic entities will be decided by local government.  
The framework of this new health insurance system is demonstrated in Figure 3.  
The payment procedure is similar with the three-phase passage model.  The 
self-payment threshold that activates socially pooled fund is 10% of average annual 
local wage and the maximum that could be pooled out of the socially pooled fund is 
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Figure 3 Framework of the Basic Health Insurance System for Urban Employees 
 
Just as any other reform in China, this new risk pooling reform faced lots of 
obstacles.    Beneficiaries of the previous free health care system oppose the employee 
contribution and self-payment; private or foreign companies which have more young 
and healthy employees oppose pooling risks with working units which have more old 
employees.  There are also several problems in this reform.  In terms of policy 
design, the self-employed people and the dependents of the urban employers are not 
included; therefore, although the coverage is relatively broad, it is still not universal 
coverage.  In terms of policy implementation, many working units refuse to 
participate because of the reasons described above.    Also, in some places, the illegal 
use of the insurance cards also exists – several people use one account.    It results the 
rapid depletion of the personal accounts (Tang 2006). 
Despite the problems, the participation of basic health insurance in urban has 
increased in the past 10 years especially since 1999 (See Figure 4).  The number of 
participants has increased from 2901000 in 1993 to 124037000 in 2004.  If use the 
total number of the working population and the retired population as the base number, 
the coverage percentage has reached 39.8% in 2004.  This increase reflects the 
government’s effort in approaching the universal coverage. 
 
Figure 4 Basic Health Care Insurance Participation in Urban China, 1993-2004 
Basic Health Care Insurance Participation in Urban China, 1993-2004













































Source: China Labor and Social Security Yearbook, various years. 
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3.  Risk Pooling in Rural – Implementing New Cooperative Health  System   
The old cooperative health system in rural areas gradually collapsed as the 
market economic reform proceeded in China since 1980s.  The peasants, which 
constitute 70% of the Chinese population, lost even the most basic health insurance 
and most of them have to pay out-of-pocket to get health services, which 
significantly limit their access to health care.  This is one of an important reason 
that China ranks NO. 188 in the 191 countries in terms of “fairness of financial 
contribution to health systems” in the 2000 World Health Report by WHO. 
Since 1990s, the Chinese government has tried to restore the old cooperative 
health system.    However, since the collective economy in rural has been reformed to 
a market economy, the basis which the old cooperative health system relied on no 
longer exists.    As a result, the government efforts produced little effect.  According 
to the three major National Health Service Survey, from early 1990s to 2003, the 
coverage of cooperative health has  always been below 10% while the private 
out-of-pocket payment has always been about 80% (MOH 1993).   
In 2003, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture 
jointly promulgated “Circulation on the Establishment of a New-Style Rural 
Cooperative Health Care System”.    Here is a comparison between the old CHCS and 
the new-style CHCS.    First, new CHCS is initiated and organized by the government 
while the old CHCS was organized by communes.  Second, the new CHCS fund is 
financed by three sources: rural participants contribute 10 Yuan, central government 
contributes 10 Yuan, and local government contributes at least 10 Yuan.    In contrast, 
the old CHCS relies on the local  collective  economy.  Third, the new CHCS fund is 
managed and allocated on the county level while the old CHCS fund is managed on 
the village level.  Fourth, participation of the new CHCS is completely voluntary 
while participation of the old CHCS was relatively more compulsory.    Fifth, the new 
CHCS fund is primarily used for the serious illnesses that cause hospitalization and 
large health expense, while the old CHCS fund does not have this rule. (MOH, 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture 2003).   
Currently, the new CHCS is still in the trial stage.  In 2004, there were 333 
experiment counties (cities and towns) and this number has increased to 641 in 2005.     
Till June 2005, 163 million rural population participated in the new CHCS (Gu 2006). 
The new CHCS is a great step forward in the risk pooling in rural areas.  
However, there are several problems in the designing of this rural health insurance 
system.    The first problem is voluntary participation.  Although  the initial intention 
of making the participation voluntary is to avoid additional burden on the peasants, 
the result is that it actually excludes the rural poorest population – those who are so 
poor that they must make every cent in their pocket count in order to survive and 
therefore could not afford the 10 Yuan premium.  As a result, the governments 
subsidize 20 Yuan to the participants – the relatively rich population in rural.    This is 
“regressive” and hurts the poor most.  The second problem is that it is primarily for 
serious illnesses.    Rural areas are the important stage of primary health care.    More 
attention should be paid to common diseases which are more cost-effective.  Many   13
peasants become seriously ill because they did not get treatment in the beginning 
when they were not that sick.  Besides, according to the national statistics, the 
average health expenditure per person in rural China in 2004 is 130.6 Yuan, which is 
much more than the 30 Yuan fund (Gu 2006).  Given the rising prices of health 
services and medicine, it is questionable how much real benefit this insurance could 
offer to the participants. 
Besides those designing problems, the collection and administration of the health 
funds as well as the set up of the surveillance system are also difficult tasks.   
4.  Lack of Strategic Purchasing 
As discussed above, the health insurance system in China is far from complete.  
Strategic purchasing, which is performed by the insurer in many cases or government 
in other cases, has not happened in China yet.     
Strategic purchasing could take advantage of scale economy, and more importantly, 
it offers better bargaining capacity regarding price, quality and opportunity of services, 
especially in dealing with natural monopolies on supply (WHO 2000).  Strategic 
purchasing deals with three challenges: what interventions to buy? From whom? How 
to buy them? (WHO 2000)  In China, “what interventions to buy” is always decided 
by the health care provider because of information asymmetry; but patients enjoyed the 
freedom on “from whom to buy” since they can choose the hospitals at their discretion; 
regarding “how to buy”, the predominant way is the retrospective out-of-pocket 
payment.   
Currently, there is no real third party payer in the Chinese health care market (Gu 
2006).  Even in the presence of the health insurance, the patients usually need to pay 
for service first, and then get the reimbursement from the insurer.    In this situation, the 
patient still act as a single buyer.  Other payment mechanisms, such as line item 
budget, global budget, capitation and diagnostic related payment, although usually 
perform much better than fee-for-service in terms of cost containment, are not 
introduced in the current health care system in China.     
Just as in many other developing countries in the world, the movement from a 
retrospective provider payment system to strategic purchasing arrangements in China 
would not be an easy task.    Even in the recently reformed health care system in urban 
and rural, principles of strategic purchasing are still absent.     
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IV. Health Care System Performance – Both Equity and Efficiency Matter 
 
China’s health care system underwent dramatic changes since 1980s.  Despite the 
disarray in rural health care, defects in the policy and other problems discussed in the 
previous chapters, the general health status of Chinese people has not deteriorated 
since 1980s.  It is believed that rising overall living standards, improved nutrition 
and better education have contributed to the health status.  Also, Chinese people 
have being spending more on health care: health expenditure increase from 11.0 
billion Yuan (3.04 % of GDP) in 1978 to 759.0 billion Yuan (5.55 % of GDP) in 2004 
(MOH 2005).  As a result, the quality and quantity of medical establishments 
improved a lot in the past twenty years.    However, inequity in health and health care 
has become a more and more prominent problem since the health care reform.  
Inefficiencies also become an issue that can not be neglected.  Generally speaking, 
the health care reform is unsuccessful (State Council Development Research Center 
2005) . 
1.  Achievements  
Life expectancy and infant mortality are usually used to measure the health status of a 
population.    In China, from 1981 to 2000, the average life expectancy increases from 
67.9 to 71.4 and the infant mortality decreases from 34.7 ‰ to 28.4 ‰ (MOH 2005) 
(see Table 5).  It is about 3.4 years increase in life expectancy and 6.3 ‰ decreases 
in infant mortality.  Progress has been made, albeit slower than the world average.  
According to WHO, for all member states from 1980 to 1998, the average life 
expectancy increased 4 years and the infant mortality decreased 23 ‰ (Wang 2003).  
Table 6 demonstrated the detailed comparison. 
Number of medical establishments and health professionals has greatly increased 
in the past twenty years.  In 1980, there are only 9902 hospitals (including general 
hospital, Chinese medicine hospital and specialty hospital) and 102472 clinics in 
China.  In 2004, the number of hospitals increased to 18393 and the number of 
clinics increased to 208794. (MOH 2005) (see Table 7)  Number of beds in health 
institutions increased from 2184423 in 1980 to 3045847 in 2004 (MOH 2005), 
although actually the beds in city hospitals increased a lot while the beds in county 
hospital declined. (see Table 8)    The number of health professionals per 1000 capital 
rises from 2.85 in 1980 to 3.46 in 2004. From 1990 to 2002, the number of middle 
and high level health professionals, which includes medical health professionals, 
medicine professionals (pharmacists), nursing professionals and technical 
professionals, increased from 729070 to 1182449 (MOH 2005). (see Table 9).  
Another measurable improvement is the progress on medical technology and 
equipments.  Hospitals are likely to purchase the high-tech medical equipments for 
which they could charge a high examination fee.  In 2004, the number of medical 
equipments that are worth more than 1 million Yuan reaches 23951 (MOH 2005).         15
2.  Inequality in Health, Health Care Demand and Utilization 
As discussed above, since the economic reform and health care reform, the overall 
health status of the Chinese population has generally improved, albeit slowly than the 
world average and more slowly than prior to the reforms.    However, overall numbers 
are misleading in the sense that it masks the health inequality between subgroups: 
rural vs. urban, rich provinces vs. poor provinces, high-income population vs. low 
income population, etc.    Regarding Infant Mortality Rate (IMR), it declined between 
1990 and 2005 in both rural and urban areas (MOH 2001; United Nations 2005).  
IMR in rural areas is always 2-3 times higher compared with IMR in urban areas, 
despite the fact that the gap has being getting narrower since 1990.  Inequality of 
health status also exists among different provinces.  As shown in Figure 5, life 
expectancy is higher in richer provinces than in poor provinces. 
  Inequity in Health Care Demand (See Table 11: Health Care Demand 
(Self-reported morbidity within last 2 weeks prior to interview, chronic disease rate 
and self reported bed-days percentage during past 12 months) by Income Quintile and 
Urban/Rural 1993,1998 and 2003:   
In urban areas, the self-reported 2-week morbidity rates for almost all income 
quintiles went down from 1993 to 2003 (See Table 10 for quintile group definition).  
In contrast, in rural areas, self-reported 2-week morbidity rates went up for all income 
quintiles during the same period.  As a result, the overall self-reported 2-week 
morbidity rates become similar (1.3%-1.4%) in urban and rural areas, respectively.    In 
both rural and urban, higher income population has a lower self-reported 2-week 
morbidity rate. 
Regarding chronic disease rate, the urban population chronic disease rate 
decreased from 1993 to 2003, with the 5
th income quintile (lowest income) group 
decreased the slowest.  In rural areas, the 1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd quintile group’s chronic 
disease decreased while the 4
th and 5
th group’s chronic disease rate increased.  As a 
result, people with higher income are less likely to have chronic disease.  The gap 
between rural and urban widened considerably for all income quintiles. 
In 1993 the annual illness bed-days percentage was similar in urban and rural 
populations, i.e.2.22 and 2.23.  In 2003, these rates had increased to 3.69 and 3.40, 
respectively. 
  Inequity in health care utilization (See Table 12: Health Care Utilization 
(Two week visits and Annual hospitalization rate) by Income Quintile and 
Urban/Rural 
The outpatient service utilization decreased for all urban income quintiles.  For 
the rural populations, the service utilization decreased faster for the higher quintile 
and slower for lower quintile.  Overall, therefore, the gap which existed for 
outpatient service utilization in 1993 between the rural and urban populations had 
narrowed by 2003.  The non-attendance rate also increases for both rural and urban 
from 1993 to 2003. 
Inpatient service utilization decreased between 1993 and 2003 for the all urban 
except for the 5
th quintile and increased for the all rural income quintiles.  The   16
non-attendance rate increased for all urban population and decreased for all rural 
population.  Overall, the gap in inpatient admissions between urban and rural is 
getting smaller. 
3.  Inefficiencies in Resource Allocation and Service Delivery 
Inefficiency exists in resource allocation of health care.    Partly due to the non-system 
health care in the rural areas and low health care capacity of small towns, more and 
more patients choose to go to the higher level hospitals or city hospitals when they 
feel necessary.  At the same time, more government funding is allocated to the city 
hospitals because of the increase in demand.  As a result, more and more resources 
were transferred to the city hospitals.  From 1980 to 2004, number of beds in city 
hospitals rises from 903323 to 2089410, while number of beds in county hospitals 
drops from 1281100 to 956437 (MOH 2005) (see Table 9).  Still, hospital beds are 
always filled to capacity, which doesn’t accrues to efficiency but to rampant 
inefficiency (Hsiao 1995).  In contrast, the average occupancy rates for township 
health center is less than 50% and most health professionals there work at only half of 
there capacity (MOH 1991).     
Another phenomenon is the overuse of unnecessary or expensive drugs.  Driven 
by the market forces, many doctors try to prescribe more drugs than necessary and 
always prefer expensive drugs to cheap drugs even if there is no significant difference 
in efficacy.    For example, currently in China, overuse of anti-biotic already becomes 
a serious problem.  About 80,000 patients die of overuse/inappropriate use of 
anti-biotic annually in average.  About 80% of the impatient health care uses 
anti-biotic, which is much more higher than the world average 30% (China Youth 
2004).  Overuse of drugs not only result in inefficiency but also has serious adverse 
effects on patients’ health.       
In terms of service delivery, inefficiency is also prevalent.    The average length of 
impatient hospital stay in China is about three times than the U.S. (Hsiao 1995).  
Patients are always admitted to hospital several days before the operation because of 
the low efficiency of surgery scheduling.  As a result, patients need to stay in the 
hospital to wait for the operation.  Those problems are attributable to the 
organizational structure of the hospitals.    Generally speaking, hospital directors don’t 
have the power to fire a staff and very few of them have the incentive to improve the 
operation efficiency since their main duty is to provide health service and make 
revenue cover expenses.     17
V. Options for Reform   
 
1. Options for Organizational Reforms 
 
The rising prices of health care and medicine, inefficiency and inequity in health care 
and many other emerging issues after health care reform have become one of the 
major social problems in China.  Someone takes a critical view on the marketization 
of health care and contend that government should take over the responsibility while 
others contend for a managed competition in health market to solve the problem.  
This chapter would first discuss the possible roles of government in health care, and 
then the two possible directions – government taking responsibility and managed 
competition – will be described and discussed.   
 As reviewed in the first chapter, government shoulders lots of responsibility in 
managing or providing health care in most of the successful health systems in the 
world.  In 2003, share of government health expenditure in total health expenditure 
in all member countries of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) exceed 44% and more than two thirds of them exceed 65% (OECD 2005) 
(See Table 13) In China, the determinant of the great achievements in public health 
under the planned economy from 1949 to 1980s is that government was playing the 
leading role (State Council Development Research Center 2005).  No matter what 
option should be adopted, the key point is to strengthen government’s role in health 
care.  .    
The Possible Roles of Government in Health Care Market 
Government’s possible role as health care provider, payer, insurer and regulator will 
be discussed here. 
  Government as Health Care Provider: 
 Government could set up the health care system and provide health care to the 
population.  Currently in China, most hospitals are still owned by the state but 
actually most them have gained autonomy and are more driven by the market force.  
As a result, insufficient resource was allocated to the rural area and the primary health 
care system.    Government needs to take more responsibility in providing health care 
especially in the primary health care system.  In other words, government should 
directly control hospitals and other health institutions, and shoulder the responsibility 
of both managing public health system and providing basic health care to the 
population.  This model might incur other problems such as low efficiency and bad 
responsiveness, but it could be managed through other regulation policies.       
After all, investment on health care is for the population’s interest.    Nowadays in 
the world, health institutions in most developed countries are  still  state-owned.  Even 
in the U.S. where free markets are highly developed, four government agencies 
provide health care services to defined segments of the American population: the 
Department of Defense to military Service members and their families; the Veterans' 
Administration to veterans; the Indian Health Service (IHS) to American Indians and   18
Alaska Natives, and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to 
underserved Americans through its system of primary health care clinics.   
  Government as Payer 
Government as payer of health care services, might be effective in confining the 
increasing cost of health services.  In this case, government could play the role of a 
third party payer.    Currently in China, although there are large number of patients in 
the health care market, they always approach the health provider as single consumer 
and therefore could not take advantage of the “scale economy”.  In the presence of 
third party payer, the consumers as a group would have more bargaining power and 
the strength of consumer and supplier would be much more balanced. 
Currently, the health care delivery method is fee-for-service (FFS).    It is least 
effective in cost containment compared with other payment methods.    Even if in the 
presence of insurance, patients usually need to pay it first and then get the 
reimbursement.    Government as the payer could transform the current payment 
option to prepayment, such as line item budget, global budget, capitation and 
diagnostic related payment.     
For instance, in the U.S., the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
is the nation's largest payer.    CMS tries to help patients become more effective health 
care consumers. In general, CMS has the ability to influence the market because it 
represents a large number of patients.    Currently, CMS is seeking advice on possible 
roles it might play from the Connecting for Health public-private collaborative. 
  Government as insurer 
Government could play the role of insurer and provide universal coverage for the 
whole population.    An important feather of this scenario is that it would improve the 
equity in access to health care.    This is especially appealing for China in some sense.   
Currently in China, equity in health care has become an urgent problem that need to 
be solved.   If everyone in this country has the health care insurance provided by the 
government, they would have a more equitable access to health care in terms of 
financial affordability.     
A potential problem is budgeting. According to the current health care 
expenditure level in China, a universal health care coverage for both urban and rural 
would take 60-70 billion Yuan (Gu 2006) and currently China is already spending 
more than 5% of the GDP on health care.    It is a question that if China could afford 
to spend more than that on health care.    However in the 1950s to 1970s, China used 
to spend about 3% on health care and still achieved universal coverage and improved 
health status.  Therefore, if carefully designed, this universal coverage is still 
possible.  Meanwhile, from the stand point of the government, the investment in 
health is very cost-effective.     
  Government as Regulator 
Government as regulator of health care market, could play an important role not 
only in a well functioning market but also in case of market failure.  In both cases, 
government needs to create and modify the regulatory environment in which suppliers 
and consumers are both in relatively balanced positions.  Government should 
oversight the health care market and use constitutional tool or law enforcement to   19
regulate  the  market.   
It needs to be made clear that government as regulator is different from the direct 
administrative relationship between hospitals and governments as it was in the past.  
Administrative management is an internal management within one system while 
government as regulator is in the context of the market.  Government regulation is 
not an opponent of the free market but a guide and monitor. 
Strengthen Government Responsibility 
One key element in the health care system in the past plan economic was the 
stress on government responsibility.    Government responsibility in health care covers 
two areas: one is in funding and resource allocation and another is the complete 
interaction in the construction and development in the health care system (State 
Council Development Research Center 2005).     
Public health belongs to the category of public good.  Therefore, a basic 
function of the government is to provide public health service, even in a highly 
developed free market environment.  To provide this service, one funding option is 
through tax collection and then the government functions as health provider; another 
option is to provide universal health care coverage by the government.    Example for 
the former is the Singapore health care system.    However, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
an unspoken assumption for the Singapore model is that the majority of their 
population is working population.    In China, it is a different case and the percentage 
of working population is much smaller.  Therefore, there will be more difficulty in 
setting up the universal health care scheme.   
Currently, decreasing public funding in health care constitutes a problem in 
China.  However, that is not the only issue and not the most important issue.  
Appropriate use of the public funding, efficient recourse allocation and better 
management are more important in some sense.    The government needs to make sure 
that the health care resource is located relative evenly to avoid the concentration of 
resource to the developed areas.    The government also needs to oversee the structure 
of health care system to make sure that not only higher level health care but also the 
primary health care is available and accessible to the population.  In addition, the 
government should be responsible for the overall prices and quality of the health care 
to the population. 
Managed Competition in Health Care Market 
In contrast to the government taking over health care responsibilities, another option 
is the managed competition which is in the setting of a ‘market-oriented’ structure.   
In managed competition in health care, financing and insurance/third party payer 
function is separated from the provision of these services.    More specifically, 
government would undertake the responsibility of financing of health care and fund   20
competing third party payers (or budget holders) to purchase health care services from 
competing providers.    The budget holders and service providers can be both public 
and private organizations. (Productivity Commission 2002) 
Here is the demonstration of the financial flow in the managed competition model 
(Scotton 1999).    As shown in Figure 5, the general taxation and health insurance 
together with some legislative co-payments would pay for the costs of health services 
to consumers.    Those payments flow from Treasury to the Health Department then 
the Health Insurance Commission (HIC) and finally to the public and private budget 
holders in the form of risk-adjusted capitation payments for their enrollees.    Using 
those payments, the budget holders would contract with service providers to purchase 
health  services.   
 
Figure 5: Managed Competition Model: Financial Flow 
 
Source: Productivity Commission 2002, Managed Competition in Health Care, Workshop 
Proceedings, AusInfo, Canberra. 
 
As a result of this managed competition, budget holders need to compete for 
customers to enroll into their program and health service providers need to compete to 
supply health care services to customers through budget holders.    This combination 
would result in effective and efficient resource use.    Currently in China, there is no 
budget holders because of the prevalence of FFS and the health service institution 
almost do not have to compete for patients because the higher level hospitals always 
have the advantage of attracting patients.    Managed competition might be a possible 
solution to the current problems but the institutional reform is required to form the 
two competing markets described above. 
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2. Options for Urban Health Care Financing   
 
The financial crisis in the old health care system in the 1990s prompts the Chinese 
state to launch successive rounds of health reforms to transform it into a new health 
care insurance system.  In new system, the medical insurance was funded by the 
combined contribution from the workplace and individuals under the administration 
of local governments.  This chapter would first take Shanghai City as a 
comparatively successful case to study a recent experience in urban health insurance 
reform, and analyzes its funding mechanism in context of urban health insurance 
system.    In the end, alternatives of broadening urban risk pooling will be given. 
Case Study of Shanghai - A Recent Experience in Urban Health Insurance   
Shanghai is one of the most developed cities in China.    The health status in this city 
is also among the top: the average life expectancy reached 79.52 years and infant 
morality rate dropped to 5.01‰ in 2002 (MOH 2004).    In this context, the reform of 
urban health insurance started in the end of 2000.  In the reformed health insurance 
system, the employers were required to offer 10% annual wage of the total employees 
for their basic health insurance while the employees spend 2% of their monthly wage 
in purchasing the insurance.  In addition, the employers are required to contribute 
2% annual wage of the total employees to establish the local health funds for the 
employees.  Because of the unique contribution combination of employees and 
employers, this system is generally called “10+2+2”.system.  The contribution goes 
to the social coordinating account and the individual account, which is similar with 
the basic health care system for urban workers issued by the central government.  
For the retirees, their individual accounts can even receive 40-45% contributions from 
employers.    At the end of 2002, about 6.76 million people joined contribution-based 
basic medical insurance schemes while and 98.35% of the employers participated 
(MOH 2004).   
In general, the health care reform in Shanghai is successful in supplying health 
insurance to the mass population.  Shanghai provides an example of the health care 
insurance administration: on one hand, local governments have greater flexibility in 
determining the benefit structure; on the other hand, successful implementation of 
new policy requires a more cost-effective institutional arrangement for administering 
the newly established health insurance schemes. 
Analysis of the Funding Mechanisms 
Shanghai model represents an exploration in funding health care insurance.  The 
scheme in Shanghai raises more money for medical insurance by putting heavy 
burden on the employers.    It decreases the non-compliance rate of the employees and 
addresses their concerns that there won’t be enough money in the individual account, 
especially when they had some chronic illnesses.  The government also promises to   22
implement preferential policy for the laid-off worker if they would like to join this 
system.  The combination of multilayer funds in Shanghai accomplishes the equal 
standard of basic health service in terms of building medical security system, access 
to health service, subsiding basic health service and so on.  There are also 
shortcomings in this funding model.  For instance, the establishment of individual 
account laid little concern on income difference, despite its consideration on age 
difference.   
In general, urban health care financing does not constitute a serious problem 
compared with rural health care financing .    After all, in the joint effort of employers, 
employees and government funding, the basic health care insurance for the working 
force could always be secured.  However, the health care insurance for the 
disadvantaged group, eg, the unemployed population, has always been consciously or 
unconsciously overlooked.  For that vulnerable population, the government should 
take out a reasonable amount of money to directly compensate for their health cost in 
the form of subsidy.  Take U.S. for example, even though its health care system is 
highly commercialized, the government subsidizes the elderly and the poor through 
various programs.  Currently in China, the budget provided by the central and 
provincial authorities may not be sufficient to cover a large uninsured population.  
Still, intermediate steps could be taken to subsidize the disadvantaged population, 
directly or indirectly, as long as there is enough attention on this issue.     
Directions of Broadening Urban Risk Pooling   
In addition to the current basic health care insurance for the working population, 
health care insurance needs to be broadened to include their dependents, which would 
greatly expand the current health care insurance coverage.  The cost could also be 
shared by the employer, employee and the government.  The self-employed also 
needs to be included in the scheme.  Since they are both employers and employees, 
they would simply be asked to pay for both parts, just like Singapore does, or they can 
purchase commercial health care insurance if they feel it is too much to pay as both 
employees and employers.  Still, it is an ambitious go to achieve universal coverage 
in the urban population, and some intermediate steps might need to be taken before 
we achieve the long term goal. 
In the end, it is important to establish multilayer medical insurance schemes on the 
basis of basic medical insurance.    In addition to establishing the basic urban medical 
insurance system, the government should gradually form medical security setups 
integrating replenishment, business insurance and social relief.  Health services 
should be integrated in accordance with the principle of enlarging the coverage of the 
whole population and special attention ought to be paid to the integration of medical 
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3. Options for Rural Health Care Financing 
 
Since the household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to output 
was implemented in early 1980s, Chinese rural areas have experienced tremendous 
changes in the economic and social landscape.  As a result, there have been 
fundamental reforms in health care programs in rural areas.  In this process, the 
funds from government are far from sufficiency to support the numerous rural 
populations.  Differences in health care expenditure are striking across urban and 
rural areas.  The urban-to-rural health expenditure ratio was at 7/3 whereas 
urban-to-rural population ration was reversed at 3/7 in 1996 (Liu 2003).   To solve 
emerging conflicts in rural medical care, new CHCS is established, trying to pool the 
voluntary contributions of local residents and organize medical services at the local 
community level. 
This chapter would first take eight counties in Hubei province as a typical case to 
study the experience for rural health insurance reform, and then compared volunteer 
and compulsory insurance through analyzing their advantages and disadvantages. In 
the end, financing and government responsibility in establishing new CHCS will be 
discussed.   
Case Study of Hubei Province - The Experience for Rural Health Insurance   
Hubei province is a typical agricultural province where 71.36% of the total 
populations lived in the rural area.  In 2002, there were at least 2 million rural 
populations who returned to poverty level because of expensive medical care.    As an 
attempt, eight counties were chosen as the experimental units to implement the policy 
of new-style cooperative medical insurance in 2003. 
In the experiment counties, the process begins by publicizing the structure of the 
new-type system, with an emphasis on how the participants could benefit from it.  
After the general propaganda, the government staff would go to peasants’ family to 
register and sign the contrast with them, if they wish.    Upon their participation, they 
need to 10 or 15 Yuan per year.    For the rest of the funding, 5-10 Yuan comes from 
province government and at least 5 Yuan from local government/community. 
(General Office 2004).  To avoid appropriation by other sectors, the money raised 
for the new CHCS goes into a separate account and then divided into four funds, 
which includes out-patient account, hospitalization account, risk account and health 
examination account. (Yang, 2004)  Out-patient and hospitalization funds constitute 
27.4 and 62.2 per cent of the total funds, respectively.  The physical examination 
funds and risk funds were also brought to the financing system. (Yang, 2004)    In the 
framework of cooperative medical scheme, the replenishment of medical care is 
positively associated with medical expenditure and negatively associated with the 
level of medical institutions attended. (See Table 14).  The new CHCS will start to 
pay for the health care expense only after self-payment reaches the replenishment 
level. 
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New CHCS was implemented smoothly in eight experimental counties.  By the 
end of October 2003, about 2.42 million people have been involved in the cooperative 
medical care system, with a high participation rate of 65 percent.    About 1.4 million 
out-patients have been benefited from the insurance system while over 20555 
hospitalized patients have. In two counties, ratio of out-patient replenishment even 
reached 80 percent. (See Table 14)   These results have demonstrated cooperative 
medical scheme is basically successful in these experimental counties. (Huang, 2005) 
Several factors contribute to those progresses.  First, the premium is relatively low 
and affordable to most rural population.  For all the experimental counties, the 
peasants’ funds for medical insurance were less 1 per cent of  their  income.  In  some 
area people still do not completely trust the new system. Therefore, a scheme like this 
with low premium is relatively easy to implement.  Second,  strong  propagandism  by 
the government plays an important role.  In contrast with urban people, the 
populations in rural China are accessible to limited information in most cases.  
Short-term and concentrated propagandism is effective in enhancing their awareness 
of policy and institutions in new cooperative medical scheme.   
Problems also exist in Hubei province.  Replenishment levels are uneven with 
the maximum 20000 Yuan and minimum 3000 Yuan.  In  all  the  experiment  counties, 
only a quarter of hospitalized peasants benefited from replenishment scheme. (Yang 
2004)  The operation of medical system was of a low level due to insufficient 
financial  support  from  government.  Besides,  how to keep the system consistent and 
stable is worthy of further study, despite good operation under temporary 
concentrated concerns. 
Health Insurance: Compulsory vs. Voluntary 
Whether to choose voluntary or compulsory is a key issue of new CHCS and is very 
controversial. According to the current policy, cooperative rural health care is 
established on the basis of willingness, despite a strong sense of compulsion wherein. 
However, the coverage rate of new CHCS in the large rural population remains a 
problem and efforts needs to be made to persuade peasants to purchase the insurance, 
since allocating quota is no longer permitted in new scheme.  Besides, the 
poverty-stricken group is unconsciously overlooked because of this voluntary 
principle.  For poverty-stricken group, they could not afford the participation 
premium and thus are deprived of the right of sharing the benefit.  The capital is 
circulated from the government directly to the comparatively rich people, resulting in 
a deepened economic gap in rural region.  In this sense, the voluntary principle 
contradicts with the principle of protecting the poor. (Fang 2004)   
To address this problem, especially extra burdens the “compulsory” exerts on the 
rural population, one solution is to make the new CHCS compulsory but subsidize the 
poorest group while make those relatively rich population pay their own premium.  
However, it is too difficult in implementation and administration, and would 
inevitably results in more problems and conflicts.  An option is to combine this 
system with the social security system that’s already been built in urban and gradually   25
expands it to rural.     
Another potential problem is that, the new CHCS puts emphasis on insuring 
severe illness.  The population with better health might retreat from this system and 
the local government would have more difficulty in financing the system, which may 
force them to consciously limit participation in order to reduce cost.   
Financing Rural Health Care Options 
The financing mechanisms in community should follow at least three principles: 
equity, openness, and be in accordance with economic status (Liu 2006).  The rural 
people should enjoy the equal right in term of health care as the urban people and the 
government needs to pave the road.  In terms of insurance spending, the 
administration should attempt to make the whole process open and accessible to all 
the insured people and actively accept the supervision from them.    This activity will 
enhance people’s trust in the new CHCS and attract more people to participate in its 
system.   
Inevitably, there have been a lot of various difficulties in financing rural health 
care. Income instability of peasants, the lack of suited legislation and high 
administration cost are barriers on financing schemes (MOH 2004).  The current 
policy in the poor region is to insure as many people as possible with basic medical 
care.    However, patients with a severe illness face the risk of bankruptcy.    Besides, 
the competition between public and private medical institutions has negative impact 
on the peasants’ enthusiasm in participating in the insurance system.  In the 
framework of the new policy, the peasants generally need to pay the cash first and 
then apply for reimbursement.  The prices of drug and health service in public 
hospitals are higher than that of private clinics in most cases.  As a result, people 
prefer go to private sector, which is included in the new CHCS. 
Financing methods should be more flexible in order to attract more people to join 
the cooperative medical system.  Considering that peasants have less cash, the local 
governments in some areas (Henan province) have ever tried to replace the cash 
premium with farm products. (Liu 2006)      It has been demonstrated that the peasant 
welcomes this policy, and the administration cost is lower.    However, it takes a long 
time to sell the products and get cash for the new CHCS funding.   Meanwhile, 
many other factors such as product price, would influence the operation of the system. 
The “compulsory participation”, where the governments pay the premium for the 
farmers using the tax money，was adopted in some places so as to improve the 
coverage of the cooperative medical scheme.  However the peasants indirectly bear 
the burden because the local government usually has to exert more tax on them.  In 
many cases, the peasants’ resist to insurance medical system did not result from the 
financing mechanisms themselves, but something else, e.g. low quality of health care 
service in town hospitals.  The simultaneous improvement of health care service in 
rural areas can encourage the peasants’ participation in the new CHCS. 
In the marketing economy, the government can make full use of various economic 
tools to finance the new CHCS.  For example, the central government can raise   26
money by issuing the lottery and national bond or by raising the tobacco tax. 
The government could also adopt various options to improve the financing 
mechanism and the operation procedure.  One suggestion is that the government 
should adopt “regional discrimination” – that is, to adopt different financing policy in 
the rural regions with different income levels.  Some suggestions have been put 
forward recently to divide Chinese rural areas into three parts in medical care system: 
the rich region, the region with middle income and the region with low income.  
Such discrimination scheme could also be used to direct the development of urban 
insurance system, advanced cooperative medical care system and medical relief 
system respectively (MOH 2004).  Another suggestion is that local or central 
governments directly invest on the social relief scheme which could indirectly help 
with the medical care problem among the poor population.  In fact, the government 
has been aware of this issue and tried to improve in the past twenty years.  In terms 
of social relief and welfare, the state annual financial expenditure have inscreased 
from 0.53 billion Yuan in 1980 to 14.2 billion in 2002 (National Bureau of Statistics 
2002, see Figure 6).   
Despite those efforts, financing health care for rural population is still a daunting 
task and the government needs to manage all the conflictions as well as face many 
dilemmas.    There is still a long way to go in financing the new CHCS. 
 
Recommendations and Policy Implications   
It is generally believed that the health care reform in China was not successful (State 
Council Development Research Center 2005).  The overall effects of the reform is 
negative, which is represented by increasing inequity in health service access and 
decreasing efficiency of health care delivery and investment.    Today the problems in 
health care system can no longer be neglected and reassessing the public policy and 
development strategy should be a priority on government agenda.  Based on the 
analysis in the previous chapter, general recommendations on government 
responsibility, health care financing and legislation will be discussed in this chapter. 
Government Responsibility 
Health care system is not a system independent of social, economic and political 
environment.  On the contrary, it has significant effects and at the same time is 
significantly affected by both the economic and the institutional structure.   
Therefore, it would be a huge challenge to reform health care system without 
corresponding social and economic support.     
First of all, the government needs to pay real attention the health care reform and 
prioritize it on government agenda.  In the past several years, the economic 
development has been the top priority and health care system did not get the attention   27
it deserves.  Although some health status indicator, such as life expectancy, is 
relatively high, the actual health status of the population, especially some subgroups 
like rural residents and intellectuals, is becoming poorer.  The rapid economic 
growth in China is in some sense at the expense of population health, especially the 
health of the disadvantaged groups, and the environment.  Now the emergence of 
serious problems in health care system has become a potential threat to economic 
development and social security, the Chinese government should not continue to 
ignore all the problems and should make health care system reform a priority. 
Secondly, the aims of the reform policy that government would adopt should be 
to improve the population health status instead of generating profit for institutions or 
industry.    In the past years, many reform strategies, such as marketization of medical 
establishments and decreasing organized financing, aimed to develop the health care 
“industry”.  Now hospital in big cities has become one of the most profitable 
institutions, while on the other hand hundreds and thousands of poor people do not 
have sufficient access to health care services.  For future health policy, improving 
population health status should be a major goal.     
Thirdly, current government agencies should be reformed so that one of the 
government agencies is ultimately responsible for health care.  In the present 
agencies, health care reform related responsibilities are distributed to many different 
departments, which includes at least Ministry of Health, State Medicine and Food 
Administration, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Security.    As a result, there is more joint effort 
but little centralized effort to push the comprehensive health care reform and no one 
is ultimately responsible for the final results.  To change this situation, a new or 
reformed department with definite duties and responsibilities should be formed for 
the future health care reform.   
However, this report is not recommending that government taking over all health 
care responsibilities.  Under the oversight of the government, managed competition 
which is in the setting of a ‘market-oriented’ structure should be encouraged in order 
to foster the further development of health care system. 
Health Care Financing 
Chinese government should increase funding for public health programs and 
subsidize health services for the disadvantaged groups.   
At present, the limited public spending is mostly used to expand and upgrade 
hospitals in big cities.  Coupled with the decreasing government funding and fiscal 
decentralization of health sector, many public-good type programs becomes under 
funded and hindered.  This is against the general public health principle: it is 
generally believed that public health spending, such as spending on preventive 
service institution and surveillance programs, should be supported by the government.   
Investment on public health is very cost-effective compared with investment on 
health  service.  Besides,  insufficient  public funding for those programs would result   28
in insufficient consumption, and eventually decreasing health status of the general 
population.  Further investigation and research is needed in order to give the 
quantitative recommendation for government expenditure on public health programs. 
Regarding subsidizing the disadvantaged population, targeting is very important.  
Poor villages and poor urban populations who could not afford basic health services 
should be subsidized by the government.  Currently the new CHCS in rural area 
only subsidize people with serious illness, which is not reasonable.  Although as a 
general principle, government should not subsidize health services that people will 
readily buy for themselves, this principle does not apply to CHCS funding.    For one 
reason, many serious diseases develop from illness that did not get treated in the early 
stage; for another, the most impoverished population could not afford even the basic 
health service.  Therefore, it is recommended that the government subsidize the 
basic health services, instead of serious illness medical service, for the poorest 
population. 
Besides all the spending priority discussed above, one important task in health 
care financing is to enhance government accountability in funding managing and 
resource  allocating.     
Legislation on Health Care 
Various solutions have been proposed by the scholars and by the public after the State 
Council Development Research Center announced in 2005 that the health care reform 
was not successful.    One of the suggestions is to draft a comprehensive legislation to 
solve the current problems from a legal aspect.  However, this report recommends 
that the government should not hastily come up to a health care legislation. 
At present, the most fundamental problems in the health care reform come not 
from the lack of legislation, but from the commercialization of public goods.     
Till today, several legislations and policies have been passed in the past ten years 
to address the various problems emerged.  Despite the limited positive effects of 
those legislations, new problems/conflictions and public dissatisfaction continued to 
develop during this process.    Therefore, before the general direction of future health 
care reform was decided, before the positioning of government in health care was 
clear, a health care legislation would not be much helpful in solving the current 
problem.  On the contrary, it would just further disappoint the population and 
undermine the credibility of legislature.  A comprehensive health care legislation is 
necessary only after the government responsibility and health care financing problems 
were solved.   29
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Table 1 Composition of hospital incomes in China (1980-2000) 
Items  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Total Income (CNY100 million)  292.6 428.6 702.2  1,003.4  2,296.5 
% of medical service  18.9 22.2 28.6 34.7 40.2 
% of drugs  37.7 39.1 43.1 49.8 47.1 
% of government subsidies  21.4 20.2 11.6  7.5  8.7 
% of other source  22.1 18.6 16.7  7.9  4.0 
Source: Ministry of Health (2001) 
 
Table 2 Central and Local Budgetary Expenditure and Their Proportions (1981-2003) 
Absolute amount (100 million yuan)  Proportion (%) 
Year 
National Central  Local Central Local 
1981 1138.41  625.65  512.76  55.0  45.0 
1982 1229.98  651.81  578.17  53.0  47.0 
1983 1409.52  759.60  649.92  53.9  46.1 
1984 1701.02  893.33  807.69  52.5  47.5 
1985 2004.25  795.25  1209.00  39.7  60.3 
1986 2204.91  836.36  1368.55  37.9  62.1 
1987 2262.18  845.63  1416.55  37.4  62.6 
1988 2491.21  845.04  1646.17  33.9  66.1 
1989 2823.78  888.77  1935.01  31.5  68.5 
1990 3083.59  1004.47  2079.12  32.6  67.4 
1991 3386.62  1090.81  2295.81  32.2  67.8 
1992 3742.20  1170.44  2571.76  31.3  68.7 
1993 4642.30  1312.06  3330.24  28.3  71.7 
1994 5792.62  1754.43  4038.19  30.3  69.7 
1995 6823.72  1995.39  4828.33  29.2  70.8 
1996 7937.55  2151.27  5786.28  27.1  72.9 
1997 9233.56  2532.50  6701.06  27.4  72.6 
1998 10798.18  3125.60  7672.58  28.9  71.1 
1999 13187.67  4152.33  9035.34  31.5  68.5 
2000 15886.50  5519.85  10366.65  34.7  65.3 
2001 18902.58  5768.02  13134.56  30.5  69.5 
2002 22053.15  6771.70  15281.45  30.7  69.3 
2003 24649.95  7420.10  17229.85  30.1  69.9 
Note: a) The central and local revenue in this table represent the income from the central and 
local level government themselves. 
      b)  The  figure  here  excludes  debt  revenue. 
Source: Ministry of Finance http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/uploadfile/zhongyang001.xls 
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Table 3 Share of Health Expenditure in GDP in China (1978-2004) 
Year 
Health expenditure 
(100 million Yuan) 
GDP (100 million Yuan) 
Share of Health Expenditure 
in GDP (%) 
1978  110.21   3624.1   3.04  
1979  126.19   4038.2   3.12  
1980  143.23   4517.8   3.17  
1981  160.12   4862.4   3.29  
1982  177.53   5294.7   3.35  
1983  207.42   5934.5   3.50  
1984  242.07   7171.0   3.38  
1985  279.00   8964.4   3.11  
1986  315.90   10202.2   3.10  
1987  379.58   11962.5   3.17  
1988  488.04   14928.3   3.27  
1989  615.50   16909.2   3.64  
1990  747.39   18547.9   4.03  
1991  893.49   21617.8   4.13 
1992  1096.86   26638.1   4.12  
1993  1377.78   34634.4   3.98  
1994  1761.24   46759.4   3.77  
1995  2155.13   58478.1   3.69  
1996  2709.42   67884.6   3.99  
1997  3196.71   74462.6   4.29  
1998  3678.72   78345.2   4.70  
1999  4047.50   82067.5   4.93  
2000  4586.63   89468.1   5.13  
2001  5025.93   97314.8   5.16  
2002  5790.03   104790.6   5.51  
2003  6584.10   116694.0   5.62  
2004  7590.30   136515.0   5.55  
Source: China Health Statistical Year Book, China Statistical Year Book (various years) 
 
Table 4 Composition of Health Expenditure in China (1978-2004) 
Health Expenditure 
(100 million yuan) 



























1978  110.21  35.44  52.25  22.52  32.2  47.4  20.4 
1979  126.19  40.64  59.88  25.67  32.2  47.5  20.3   35
1980  143.23  51.91  60.97  30.35  36.2  42.6  21.2 
1981  160.12  59.67  62.43  38.02  37.3  39.0  23.7 
1982  177.53  68.99  70.11  38.43  38.9  39.5  21.6 
1983  207.42  77.63  64.55  65.24  37.4  31.1  31.5 
1984  242.07  89.46  73.61  79.00  37.0  30.4  32.6 
1985  279.00  107.65  91.96  79.39  38.6  33.0  28.5 
1986  315.90  122.23  110.35  83.32  38.7  34.9  26.4 
1987  379.58  127.28  137.25  115.05  33.5  36.2  30.3 
1988  488.04  145.39  189.99  152.66  29.8  38.9  31.3 
1989  615.50  167.83  237.84  209.83  27.3  38.6  34.1 
1990  747.39  187.28  293.10  267.01  25.1  39.2  35.7 
1991  893.49  204.05  354.41  335.03  22.8  39.7  37.5 
1992  1096.86  228.61  431.55  436.70  20.8  39.3  39.8 
1993  1377.78  272.06  524.75  580.97  19.7  38.1  42.2 
1994  1761.24  342.28  644.91  774.05  19.4  36.6  43.9 
1995  2155.13  387.34  767.81  999.98  18.0  35.6  46.4 
1996  2709.42  461.61  875.66  1372.15  17.0  32.3  50.6 
1997  3196.71  523.56  984.06  1689.09  16.4  30.8  52.8 
1998  3678.72  590.06  1071.03  2017.63  16.0  29.1  54.8 
1999  4047.50  640.96  1145.99  2260.55  15.8  28.3  55.9 
2000  4586.63  709.52  1171.94  2705.17  15.5  25.6  59.0 
2001  5025.93  800.61  1211.43  3013.89  15.9  24.1  60.0 
2002  5790.03  908.51  1539.38  3342.14  15.7  26.6  57.7 
2003  6584.10  1116.94  1788.50  3678.66  17.0  27.2  55.9 
2004  7590.30  1293.61  2225.40  4071.42  17.0  29.3  53.6 
Note: Since 2001, the health expenditure did not include the medical education expenditure 
Source: MOH China Health Statistical Year Book 2006 
 
Table 5 Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality in China (1981, 1990 and 2000) 
Life Expectancy (Year) 
Year 
Infant Mortality Rate
(‰)  Average Male Female 
1981  34.7   67.9   66.4   69.3  
1990  32.9   68.6   66.9   70.5  
2000  28.4   71.4   69.6   73.3  
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Rate (IMR)  Countries 
1980  1998  1980  1998 
Change of ALE 
(1980 – 1998) 
Change of IMR 
(1980 – 1998) 
China  68  70  42  31  2 -11 
Australia  74  79  11  5  5 -6 
Japan  76  81  8  4  5 -4 
Republic of Korea  67  73  26  9 6  -17 
Malaysia  67  72  30  8 5  -22 
New Zealand  73  77  13  5  4 -8 
Singapore  71  77  12  4  6 -8 
Sri Lanka  68  73  34  16  5 -18 
Low-income 
Countries 
51  55  108  79  3  －29 
Middle-income 
Countries 
64  69  53  30  5  －23 
High-income 
Countries 
73  77  15  6  4  －9 
World Average  61  65  67  44  4  －23 
Adapted  from  Wang  2003  Source:  WHO 
 











Health Centers  Clinics 
1980 9902  7859  678  694  55413  102474 
1981 10252  8044  781  718  55500  111189 
1982 10471  8146  878  731  55496  113916 
1983 10901  8370  1009  772  55559  115826 
1984 11381  8545  1218  810  55549  117028 
1985 11955  9197  1485  938  47387  126604 
1986 12442  9363  1646  1030  46967  127575 
1987 12962  9657  1790  1097  47177  128459 
1988 13544  9916  1932  1190  47529  128422 
1989 14090  10242  2046  1265  47523  128112 
1990 14377  10424  2115  1362  47749  129332 
1991 14628  10562  2195  1345  48140  128665 
1992 14889  10774  2269  1376  46117  125873 
1993 15436  11426  2298  1438  45024  115161 
1994 15595  11549  2336  1440  51929  105984 
1995 15663  11586  2361  1445  51797  104406   37
1996 15833  11696  2405  1473  51723  237153 
1997 15944  11771  2413  1488  51535  229474 
1998 16001  11779  2443  1495  50613  229349 
1999 16678  11868  2441  1533  50257  226588 
2000 16318  11872  2453  1543  49777  240934 
2001 16197  11834  2478  1576  48643  248061 
2002 17844  12716  2492  2237  46014  219907 
2003 17764  12599  2518  2271  45204  204468 
2004 18393  12900  2611  2492  42471  208794 
Source: MOH China Health Statistical Year Book 2006 
 
 
Table 8 Number of Beds in Health Institutions in China (1980 – 2004, selected years) 
Number of Beds in Health Institutions  Year 
   
Total City  County 
1980 2184423  903323  1281100 
1985 2229200  962100  1267100 
1990  2624100 1386700 1237400 
1995  2836100 1739600 1096500 
1998  2913700 1871600 1042100 
1999  2928600 1887100 1041500 
2000  2947900 1914200 1033700 
2001  2976100 1958800 1017300 
2002 2907153  1947297  959856 
2003 2955160  2001267  953893 
2004 3045847  2089410  956437 
Source: MOH China Health Statistical Year Book 2006 
 












health, medicine, nursing, 
technical) 
1990 729070  11792  91778  625500 
1995 974678  28516  139432  806730 
1997 1008663  29777  156837  822049 
1998 1046774  29506  164055  853213 
1999 1104418  30753  176284  897381 
2000 1139664  30938  182726  926000 
2001 1188721  33153  192827  962741 
2002 1182449  37748  196063  948638 
Source: MOH China Health Statistical Year Book 2006   38
 
Table 10: Income Quartile Group in 1993, 1998 and 2003 in Report of The Health Services 
Investigation (1993, 1998, 2003) 


























1 <1050  19.91  739 <314  19.98  223 
2 1050-  19.22  1255  314-  18.02  386 
3 1500-  20.67  1677  500-  21.20  546 
4 1950-  20.49  2193  666-  18.59  767 
1993 
5  2430- 19.69 3848 1000- 22.05  1596 
1 <2040  19.90  1439  <975  19.98  655 
2 2040-  20.62  2590  975-  19.13  1122 
3  3000- 19.46 3629 1332- 20.88  1558 
4  4170- 17.23 4849 1820- 19.92  2180 
1998 
5  6000- 22.79 8737 2600- 20.09  4336 
1 <2640  19.89  1773  <880  20.26  593 
2 2640-  20.31  3422  880-  18.82  1095 
3  4012- 22.57 5265 1333- 19.97  1579 
4  6060- 18.00 7752 2000- 19.51  2297 
2003 
5  9036- 19.24 15250 3000- 21.43  5063 
Source: MOH, An analysis report of national Health Services Survey in 2003. p 82 
 
Table 11: Health Care Demand (Self-reported morbidity within last 2 weeks prior to 
interview, chronic disease rate and self reported bed-days percentage during past 12 months) 
by Income Quintile and Urban/Rural 1993, 1998 and 2003 
 
Urban area  Rural area 
Items Year 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1993 14.39 15.55 17.43 17.58 18.98 12.66 12.55 12.79 12.54 12.74
1998 15.66 16.93 15.93 17.85 18.59 13.50 13.06 12.86 13.00 13.17
Two Week 
Morbidity(‰) 
2003 13.38 13.56 14.29 14.31 15.48 13.39 13.23 13.41 13.81 14.01
1993 15.74 17.14 19.75 20.51 22.26 11.43 10.20 10.09 10.30 11.48
1998 15.90 18.70 18.20 22.50 24.80 10.80 9.50 9.70  10.20 11.50
Chronic Disease 
Rate(‰) 
2003 14.24 14.62 18.40 19.48 22.21 10.31 9.85 9.59  10.38 12.07
1993  2.22 2.04 2.15 2.04 2.09 2.76 2.84 2.69 2.60 2.23 
1998  1.94 1.75 1.59 1.74 1.73 3.26 2.66 2.53 2.48 2.12 
Bed-days 
Percentage(%) 
2003  3.69 3.32 3.12 3.39 3.33 4.20 3.85 3.66 3.72 3.40 
Source: MOH, An analysis report of national Health Services Survey in 2003. p 87 
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Table 12: Health Care Utilization (Two week visits and Annual hospitalization rate) by 
Income Quintile and Urban/Rural   
Source: MOH, An analysis report of national Health Services Survey in 2003. p 87 
 
 
Table 13: Public expenditure on health as % of total expenditure (2003) 
Public expenditure on health as % of total expenditure (2003) 
Australia    67.5   a  Korea  49.4 
Austria  69.9   a  Luxembourg  85.4   a 
Belgium ..  Mexico  46.4 
Canada  69.9   b  Netherlands  62.4 
Czech Republic  90.1  New Zealand  78.7 
Denmark  83  Norway  83.7   b 
Finland  76.5  Poland  72.4   a 
France  76.3   b  Portugal  69.7 
Germany 78.2 Slovak  Republic  88.3 
Greece  51.3   b  Spain  71.2 
Hungary  70.2   a  Sweden  85.3   a 
Iceland  83.5   b  Switzerland  58.5   b 
Ireland  75.2   a  Turkey  70.9   c 
Italy  75.1  United  Kingdom  83.4   a 
Japan  81.5  a,  b  United  States  44.4 
Notes:  
1)For Germany, data prior to 1990 refer to West Germany. 
        2) a refers to year 2002, b refers to estimate and c refers to 2000. 
Definition: www.irdes.fr/ecosante/OCDE/411010.html  
Sources and Methods per country: www.irdes.fr/ecosante/OCDE/500.html 
 
Urban area  Rural area 
Items Year 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1993  21.8 19.6 22.8 22.3 26.9 17.0 17.3 16.5 18.1 18.0 
1998  16.5 16.6 15.5 18.5 20.3 18.0 16.5 16.7 17.2 16.6 
Two-Week Visit 
Rate (%) 
2003  10.1 10.2 12.0 11.8 15.0 12.9 13.6 13.8 14.5 14.7 
1993  37.5 42.7 40.2 39.4 35.9 35.4 34.2 33.5 30.3 29.4 
1998  49.1 46.1 44.1 45.5 39.9 30.7 31.0 29.5 29.0 28.6 
Non-attendance 
Rate(%) 
2003  60.2 57.7 54.2 51.2 45.2 46.0 43.6 44.7 44.5 42.9 
1993  4.53 5.13 5.26 4.86 5.32 2.71 3.08 2.89 3.17 3.37 
1998  3.07 3.07 3.67 4.26 4.20 2.17 2.07 2.03 2.39 2.81 
Annually 
Hospitalization 
Rate (%)  2003  3.36 3.03 4.55 4.66 5.65 3.29 2.80 3.03 3.52 4.19 
1993 31.67  23.84 22.42 21.04 16.87 44.23 39.50 35.43 28.18 25.30
1998 46.80  42.60 33.00 29.00 27.40 51.40 48.30 43.80 39.20 29.90
Non-hospitalization 
Rate (%) 
2003 41.58  32.30 22.73 28.23 17.18 41.04 33.80 31.33 26.40 19.45  40
Table 14 The implementation status of new-style cooperative medical system in Hubei 
province  
 





















Expenditure Ratio of Public Sectors(%)
Social Relief Expenditure(billion Yuan)
 



























1 323.8  1809  72.5 0.55  164917  2607 
2 242.2  1998  76.95 0.5 9547  977 
3 430.5  2198  86.38  0.68  25361 2814 
4 740.9  2300  39.14  0.65  62778 1961 
5 574.2  2464  86.66  0.61  966303  6362 
6 652.2  2609  31.99  0.57  46484 1907 
7 449  2929  89.23  0.51  18852  1718 
8 310.2  2979  73.69  0.34  101661  2209 
Total 3723.2  N/A  64.96  N/A  1395903 20555 